Decision

Baviera.com Stays: WIPO Three-Member Panel Finds No Bad Faith in 25-Year-Old Geographic Domain Name

In a significant decision issued on September 18, 2026, a three-member WIPO panel comprising Karen Fong (Presiding, United Kingdom), Reyes Campello Estebaranz (Spain), and W. Scott Blackmer (United States) denied the transfer of baviera.com in Clínica Baviera S.A. v. Domain Administrator, Tfourth LLC, WIPO Case No. D2026-2800.

The Complainant, a Spanish ophthalmology company operating over 130 clinics across five European countries, sought transfer of the domain registered in May 2001, arguing the Respondent had targeted its 2001 corporate expansion and media coverage. The Respondent, represented by Cylaw Solutions, maintained that “Baviera” is the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese name for Bavaria — Germany’s largest federal state — and a widespread personal surname, including the family name of the Complainant’s own founders, and that it had registered the domain as part of a consistent geographic and surname domain investment strategy.

The Panel denied the Complaint on bad faith registration, finding that the Complainant held only composite figurative marks in 2001 with no standalone BAVIERA mark until 2010; that “Baviera” retains obvious independent geographic and surname meaning with no established secondary meaning as of May 2001; that specialist Spanish and private equity media coverage would not probably have reached a Cayman Islands/US domain investor — a conclusion the Panel reinforced by independently searching contemporaneous US-localised results, which returned only references to the German state of Bavaria; and that historical PPC content was non-targeted and unrelated to the Complainant’s field of activity.

The Panel declined to find RDNH, noting the Complainant had a reasonable basis for investigation given ophthalmology-related PPC links appearing on the domain around the time of filing.

The decision affirms that geographic terms and personal surnames carry independent meaning that resists trademark monopolisation, that domain investors cannot be imputed with constructive notice of specialist European media coverage, and that the relevant question is always what the registrant knew at the date of registration — not what a complainant can construct from events occurring years later.

Decision at Wipo: 

ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER
ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Clínica Baviera S.A. v. Domain Administrator, Tfourth, LLC, WIPO Case No. D2026-2800

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Clínica Baviera S.A., Spain, represented by Ubilibet, S.L., Spain.

The Respondent is Domain Administrator, Tfourth, LLC, United Kingdom, represented by Ankur Raheja of Cylaw Solutions, India.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <baviera.com> is registered with PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 26, 2026. On June 29, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On June 30, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (unknown) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on July 6, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on July 10, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on July 13, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was August 2, 2026. On July 24, 2026, the Respondent requested for a four calendar day extension under paragraph 5(b) of the Rules and the due date for Response was extended to August 6, 2026 accordingly. The Response was filed with the Center on August 6, 2026.

The Center appointed Karen Fong, Reyes Campello Estebaranz, and W. Scott Blackmer as panelists in this matter on September 4, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

Founded in Spain in the early 1990s, the Complainant is an ophthalmology company specialising in the diagnosis, treatment and monitoring of visual disorders and eye diseases. The Complainant indicates that it now has 130 ophthalmology clinics in Spain, Germany, Austria, Italy and the United Kingdom. Its medical network includes more than 250 ophthalmologists and has performed more than 1.5 million ophthalmological treatments. The Complainant’s principal website is found at the domain name <clinicabaviera.com>.

The Complainant owns inter alia the following trade mark registrations:

• Spanish Trade Mark Registration No M1982523 for C CLINICA OFTALMOLOGICA BAVIERA (figurative), registered on February 20, 1996;
• Spanish Trade Mark Registration No. M2864633 for CLINICA BAVIERA (word), registered on June 9, 2009; and
• European Union Trade Mark Registration No. 009382681 for BAVIERA (figurative), registered on March 1, 2011
(individually and collectively referred to as the “Trade Mark”)

The Registrar reports that the disputed domain name was registered on May 6, 2001 and is held by Domain Administrator, Tfourh, LLC of Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands. That appears to be a typographical error for the company name of the Respondent as indicated in the Response is TFourth LLC of Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands. The Respondent appears to be a company engaged in domain name investment, monetization, and development. Its portfolio includes domain names comprising geographical terms and personal surnames, among others.

Since its registration, the disputed domain name has at various times resolved to parking pages displaying random pay-per-click (“PPC”) advertising links hosted by third parties unrelated to the Complainant or its field of activity, until around June 2026, when the PPC links related to ophthalmology services and the Complainant’s competitors appeared on the website at the disputed domain name. At the time of writing this Decision, the disputed domain name resolves to a landing page that displays the disputed domain name in its header and includes a search engine interface with a click-through link. The footer of this page contains the following text in smaller font: “The links on this site are generated by an automated system. Suggest new links / changes by emailing: […]@gmail.com. Disclaimer: Domain owner maintains no relationship with third party advertisers. Reference to any specific service or trademark is not controlled by domain owner and does not constitute or imply its association, endorsement or recommendation.” Additionally, the copyright notice on the page reads “© 2026 baviera.com. All rights reserved”.

Prior to filing the Complaint, on May 20, 2026, the Complainant sent a letter to the Registrar setting out its rights and the alleged violations arising from the registration and use of the disputed domain name, requesting that the Registrar immediately lock and suspend services to the disputed domain name, disclose the identity of the owner, and/or forward the letter to the registrant. The Registrar did not respond, and there is no evidence in the record indicating whether the Respondent received the letter.

5. Parties’ Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant claims that BAVIERA is the distinctive and recognisable element in its trade mark portfolio and the name by which its services have been identified and distinguished through three decades of continuous provision of ophthalmological services.

The Complainant further asserts that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its Trade Mark, as it reproduces in its entirety the term “Baviera”, the distinctive and recognisable element of the Trade Mark, which the Respondent has not been authorised to register and use in a domain name and which does not correspond to the Respondent’s name. The Respondent has not used the disputed domain name for a bona fide commercial offering or legitimate noncommercial fair use. Since its registration, the disputed domain name has not resolved to any genuine or substantive website content. It has been used exclusively for parking pages and PPC landing pages, including, since around June 2026, PPC links related to ophthalmology services and the Complainant’s competitors. The Complainant asserts that these PPC links, which relate to the Complainant’s field of activity, appear to have been generated on a keyword-targeted or monetization-based configuration specifically aligned with the Complainant’s field of activity, rather than occurring at random. The Respondent is ultimately responsible for this content, even if it is automatically generated or managed by a third-party parking service.

This is evidence of targeting, particularly since independent Internet search results demonstrate that the term “Baviera” is overwhelmingly associated with the Complainant, reinforcing that the Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name and the Complainant’s trade mark is well-known internationally. The Respondent’s failure to respond to the Complainant’s pre-complaint letter to the Registrar further supports the conclusion that it lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name and is acting in bad faith, as a respondent with a genuine explanation would ordinarily have come forward to provide one.

The Complainant further infers bad faith registration and use on the part of the Respondent because the registration of the disputed domain name on May 6, 2001 coincided with a significant phase of international commercial growth and market visibility for the Complainant. That year, the Complainant secured approximately EUR 18 million in funding from institutional investors, a major corporate milestone that laid the foundation for its subsequent international expansion, including the launch of new clinics outside Spain, in London and Milan. 2001 was also the year in which the Complainant introduced a new ophthalmological treatment. As a result, the Complainant received extensive media coverage, significantly increasing its visibility. The Complainant submits that the Respondent must be taken to have had inferred knowledge of the Complainant and its Trade Mark at the time of registration, given that this coincided with a documented period of expansion, increased investment, growing public exposure, diversification of services, and international growth.

The Complainant further contends that the disputed domain name has never been used, nor have any demonstrable preparations been made to use it, in connection with its geographical significance. Instead, the disputed domain name has been monetized through PPC links, including advertising links to offerings that compete with the Complainant’s field of activity. The Complainant submits that these PPC links are neither generic nor geographically oriented, and that these circumstances, taken together, point to registration and use in bad faith.

The Complainant further submits that the Respondent’s passive holding of the disputed domain name, combined with intermittent PPC monetization, forms part of a continuous pattern of conduct aimed at exploiting the Complainant’s Trade Mark and amounts to bad faith use.

In support of these contentions, the Complainant relies on media coverage of the 2001 investment in publications including Cinco Días on March 27, 2001 and Private Equity International on May 1, 2001.

B. The Respondent

The Respondent acknowledges that the Complainant has satisfied the first element (the standing requirement).

The Respondent asserts that it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. It is a professional domain name investment entity that has been acquiring domain names since at least 2001, with a business model of investing in domain names comprising geographical terms and personal surnames that have inherent value independent of any trade mark. The Respondent submits that this is a lawful business model, and that monetizing domain names pending development through third-party parking services is an accepted industry-wide practice.
The Respondent contends that its registration of the disputed domain name was consistent with this strategy, as “Baviera” is the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese name for Bavaria, a well-known German state, and is also a widespread personal surname in many countries, including Spain, where it is in fact the surname of the Complainant’s own founders.

The Respondent further submits that at the time of registration in 2001, the Complainant held no standalone trade mark for BAVIERA, only a composite mark incorporating the term, and that the Complainant’s first standalone BAVIERA mark was not applied for until 2010. Given the term’s obvious geographic and surname meaning independent of any trade mark, the Respondent asserts there was no intent to target the Complainant.

The Respondent contends that the PPC evidence itself supports this position. The historical PPC links were non-targeted and random, and it was not until the Respondent received the Complaint that it became aware that certain PPC links related to the Complainant’s field of activity, which it then removed immediately. The Respondent denies ever having selected ophthalmology-related keywords or directed the parking provider to display the links in question. The Respondent also denies having received the letter sent by the Complainant to the Registrar, noting that the letter was addressed to the Registrar and not to the Respondent.

The Respondent further submits that there are more than 250 companies worldwide with names incorporating “Baviera”, including its use as a surname, and that there is no exclusive association between the term and the Complainant.
The Respondent denies registering or using the disputed domain name in bad faith. It reiterates that, in 2001, the Complainant had no standalone trade mark for BAVIERA, and that given the term’s independent geographic and surname significance, there is no evidence that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with the Complainant in mind. The Respondent submits that domain investors cannot be imputed with constructive notice of trade mark registrations worldwide, particularly where a domain name has an obvious meaning independent of any trade mark.
The Respondent denies that it would have had any awareness of the Complainant’s expansion plans or associated media coverage, noting that it is a Cayman Islands-registered, United States-based domain name investor with no connection to Spain. It further submits that the Cinco Días article relied upon by the Complainant is a Spanish-language financial publication, and that the Private Equity International publication relied upon did not launch until December 2001, after the registration of the disputed domain name, such that the article in question could not have existed at the relevant time.

The Respondent submits that the passive holding doctrine established in Telstra Corporation Limited v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. D2000-0003 cited by the Complainant is confined to invented or fanciful marks with no meaning independent of the trade mark in question, which is not the case here. It further contends that the Complainant’s delay of some 25 years in bringing this proceeding is itself an indication that the Complainant never genuinely believed the disputed domain name had been registered in bad faith.

Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”)
The Respondent requests a finding of RDNH. It submits that the Complainant failed to disclose that “Baviera” is a recognised surname in Spain, and that the Complainant’s two founders themselves bear that surname. This is a material non-disclosure, particularly given that the Complainant is a Spanish company represented by Spanish counsel. The Respondent characterizes this as an improper use of the Policy and an attempt to pressure a legitimate domain name holder into relinquishing a lawfully held domain name.

The Respondent further submits that the Complainant failed to properly assess the PPC evidence. While the June 2026 PPC content may have provided legitimate grounds for investigation, it did not establish that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith on May 6, 2001, given the random nature of the links prior to that. The Respondent contends that the Complainant, represented by specialist IP counsel, was under an obligation to conduct at least minimal due diligence before filing and should be held to a higher standard – an obligation it failed to meet. In particular, the Respondent notes that the Complainant did not disclose that Cinco Días has a circulation of approximately 28,000 copies directed at the Spanish business community and would not have been accessible to a Cayman Islands-based domain name investor.

6. Discussion and Findings

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trade mark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), section 1.7.

The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trade mark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.2.1.

The Panel finds the mark is recognizable within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s C CLINICA OFTALMOLOGICA BAVIERA and C CLINICA BAVIERA marks and identical to the Complainant’s BAVIERA mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.7.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests

The requirements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy are conjunctive. A consequence of this is that failure on the part of a complainant to demonstrate one element of the Policy will result in failure of the complaint in its entirety. Accordingly, in light of the Panel’s findings in connection with the third element assessment under the Policy, it is not necessary for the Panel to address the issue of the Respondent’s rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

The Policy requires the Complainant to establish both that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith and that it has been used in bad faith. The Panel addresses registration first, since a finding that the disputed domain name was not registered in bad faith, or a finding that it has not been sufficiently proved that it was registered in bad faith, with the Complainant bearing the burden, is sufficient to defeat the Complaint under this element, regardless of the Panel’s findings on subsequent use.

The disputed domain name was registered on May 6, 2001. The Panel notes that news of a substantial investment in the Complainant’s business by Dresdner Kleinwort Capital was announced on or about May 1, 2001, days before registration, and that this investment received coverage not only in the Spanish financial publication Cinco Días, which the Panel notes has international distribution through wire services and a global reach over the Internet, but also in Private Equity International, an article the Panel has independently verified as genuine and dated May 1, 2001.1

Notwithstanding this coincidence in timing, the Panel does not find the evidence sufficient to establish that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith, for the following reasons:

First, the Complainant’s trade mark rights at the time of registration of the disputed domain name consisted only of a composite figurative mark, which appear to have corresponded to the Complainant’s business name or descriptive elements of its clinics at that time. The Complainant did not apply for a standalone word mark for BAVIERA with a device until September 17, 2010.

Second, the term “Baviera” is the Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese term for Bavaria, a well-known German region, and is independently a rare surname, including that of the Complainant’s own founders. The record does not establish that “Baviera” had acquired secondary meaning exclusively associated with the Complainant or that the mark was internationally well-known as of May 2001. To the contrary, the Panel’s own review of contemporaneous search results localised to the United States for that period returned results concerning the German state of Bavaria and Italian and German language sites, with no reference to the Complainant.

Third, the Respondent is based in the Cayman Islands, with its principal in the United States, and the record does not establish that coverage of this kind would probably have come to the attention of a United States-based domain name investor in May 2001. The Cinco Días coverage was published in a Spanish-language financial title aimed principally at the Spanish business community, and the Private Equity International article, while genuine, was directed at a specialist private equity readership rather than a general audience. The Panel’s own review of contemporaneous search results localised to the United States for that period returned results concerning the German state of Bavaria and Italian- and German-language sites, with no reference to the Complainant. On this record, the Panel is not satisfied that this narrow specialist coverage would probably have reached, or been noticed by, a domain name investor in the Respondent’s position.

Fourth, the PPC advertising evidence submitted by the Complainant does not establish that the Respondent had the Complainant in mind at the time of registration of the disputed domain name. The historical PPC content, and particularly the initial content right after the registration of the disputed domain name, was non-targeted and unrelated to the Complainant’s field of activity.

Fifth, there is no evidence that the Respondent ignored the Complainant’s cease-and-desist correspondence. That letter was addressed to the Registrar rather than to the Respondent, and the Respondent denies having received it and there is no record that the Registrar has acknowledged or forwarded it.

1 Noting in particular the general powers of a panel articulated inter alia in paragraphs 10 and 12 of the UDRP Rules, it has been accepted that a panel may undertake limited factual research into matters of public record if it would consider such information useful to assessing the case merits and reaching a decision, in particular to affirm or corroborate a party’s contention. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.8.

For these reasons, while the Panel acknowledges the proximity in timing between the Complainant’s corporate expansion and developments and the registration of the disputed domain name, the Panel finds that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith. Given this finding, it is unnecessary for the Panel to determine whether the disputed domain name has subsequently been used in bad faith. The Complaint accordingly fails under the third element.

D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking

Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if after considering the submissions, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at RDNH or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. The mere lack of success of the complaint is not, on its own, sufficient to constitute RDNH. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.16.

The Panel declines to make such a finding.

The record does not establish that the Complainant was aware of the Respondent’s identity, its status as a long-standing domain name investor, or its portfolio of geographic and surname-based domain names, at the time the Complaint was filed. The Panel notes that the nature and history of the Respondent’s business, including whether it has held the disputed domain name since its original registration in 2001, is not readily ascertainable from public records, as the Respondent used a privacy service for the disputed domain name, and the Complainant’s knowledge of such matters postdates the filing of the Complaint.

Furthermore, the Complainant’s decision to bring this proceeding was not without foundation: the disputed domain name was, at and around the time the Complaint was prepared, resolving to PPC advertising links directed at the Complainant’s field of activity, providing a legitimate basis for investigation and Complaint, even if that evidence ultimately proved insufficient to establish bad faith registration. Bringing a complaint that is later found to be unsuccessful, where the complainant reasonably believed in its claims on the basis of the evidence available to it, does not amount to an abuse of the proceeding.

Accordingly, the Panel declines to find that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and makes no finding of RDNH.

7. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

Karen Fong
Presiding Panelist

Reyes Campello Estebaranz
Panelist

W. Scott Blackmer
Panelist

Date: September 18, 2026

PANELLIST:

In a significant decision dated September 10, 2026, a three-member WIPO Panel comprising Douglas M. Isenberg (Presiding), José Carlos Erdozain, and Nick J. Gardner denied the complaint filed by Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L., the Spanish operator of MalagaCar.com, seeking transfer of the domain name <malagacars.com> from domain investor Hans Lempka of Guernsey.

The Panel found that Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in the domain name by virtue of its descriptive geographic use, combining the city name “Málaga” with the generic word “cars” to redirect visitors to a mainstream car rental booking platform, and that this constituted a bona fide use exploiting the domain’s descriptive meaning rather than the Complainant’s trademark. The Panel relied heavily on two prior decisions cited by the Respondent: Erase Technologies v. Web Presence LLC (WIPO D2022-3797) and Viajes Holidaysinspain.com v. NORTAQ Ltd (WIPO D2006-1480), finding both directly applicable to the facts. The Panel also noted that the Complainant had failed to disclose its own prior UDRP loss in 2012 involving the near-identical domain <malaga-cars.com> (D2012-0941), a factor that weighed heavily in the analysis. 

On bad faith, the Panel accepted the Respondent’s signed notarised declaration that he had no knowledge of the Complainant or its Spanish trademark at the time of registration in August 2018, finding this declaration credible given the descriptive nature of the domain, the Respondent’s consistent global portfolio strategy of registering city name + travel service combinations, and the Complainant’s trademark being registered only in Spain while the Respondent is based in Guernsey. The Panel declined to find Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, despite acknowledging the Complainant’s failure to disclose the D2012-0941 precedent and the descriptive weakness of its mark, on the basis that the case was not so obviously without merit that it should never have been filed. The decision is a valuable reminder that geographic descriptors combined with generic service terms occupy a protected space in domain investment practice and that a complainant’s prior UDRP history involving nearly identical domains is a material factor that panels will scrutinise carefully regardless of whether disclosure is formally required.

ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L. v. Hans Lempka, WIPO Case No. D2026-2875

1. The Parties

Complainant is Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L., Spain, represented by Trebia Abogados, Spain.
Respondent is Hans Lempka, United Kingdom, represented by Cylaw Solutions, India.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <malagacars.com> (the “Disputed Domain Name”) is registered with Unstoppable Domains Inc. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on July 1, 2026. On July 2, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Disputed Domain Name. On July 2, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the Disputed Domain Name which differed from the named Respondent (Unstoppable Privacy Service LLC) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to Complainant on July 6, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. Complainant filed an amended Complaint on July 7, 2026, which is referred to hereafter as the “Complaint”, unless the context indicates otherwise.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on July 8, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was July 28, 2026. Respondent sent email communications to the Center on July 21, 23, and 27, 2026, regarding an extension of time to submit a response. Complainant sent an email communication on July 23, 2026, opposing Respondent’s request for an additional 10-day extension to file the Response.

On July 27, 2026, the Center granted the automatic four calendar-day extension for response under paragraph 5(b) of the Rules and further granted an extension of six days under paragraph 5(e) of the Rules. Therefore, the new due date was August 7, 2026. The Response was filed with the Center on August 7, 2026.

The Center appointed Douglas M. Isenberg, José Carlos Erdozain, and Nick J. Gardner as panelists in this matter on September 2, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

Complainant states that it “has continuously and notoriously used the trademark MALAGACAR in the Spanish market for more than 20 years, and is the legitimate holder of the principal domain name www.malagacar.com (registered prior to the disputed domain name), through which it markets its vehicle rental services”, that it “has operated under the trade name and distinctive sign ‘Malaga Car’ for an extended period, generating substantial goodwill and a high level of brand recognition in the vehicle rental market of the Málaga area”; and that “it is a widely recognized company with more than 7,600 reviews”. The website using Complainant’s domain name <malagacar.com> contains the headline, “CAR HIRE MALAGA AIRPORT”, and has a contact address in the city of Malaga, Spain.1
Complainant also states, and provides documentation in support thereof, that it is the owner of a trademark registration in Spain (No. 2,492,788) for the mark MALAGACAR.COM, which was registered on July 18, 2002, for use in connection with “car rental without driver” (Panel’s unofficial translation from Spanish). This registration is referred to herein as the “MALAGACAR.COM Trademark”.
The Disputed Domain Name was registered on August 22, 2018, and redirects to a website at “https://www.localrent.com/en/spain/malaga/”, which contains the headline,“Car rental in Malaga.”
Respondent states that he is “a professional domain name investor based in Castel, Guernsey” who “trades under the name Alpha Domains (alphadomains.com) and has been active in the domain investment industry since at least 2008, with a specific focus on the travel and tourism sector since 2011”; that he “identifies geographic combinations of real place names with travel service descriptors, acquires them through backorder services, and monetises them through affiliate programmes including Travelpayouts, a mainstream and widely-used travel affiliate network”. In support thereof, Respondent provided lists of 24 domain names in his “travel domain portfolio” that he claims “demonstrate[] the entirely systematic and non-targeted nature of his acquisition strategy”; and that “[e]very domain in this portfolio follows the identical formula: a genuine geographic place name combined with a generic travel descriptor”.

5. Parties’ Contentions

A. Complainant
Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the Disputed Domain Name. Notably, Complainant contends, in relevant part, that:
1 Complainant did not provide a screenshot of its website, but the Panel viewed it pursuant to its authority under paragraph 10 of the Rules, as “it has been accepted that a panel may undertake limited factual research into matters of public record if it would consider such information useful to assessing the case merits and reaching a decision”. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), section 4.8.

• The Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark because it “incorporates the Complainant’s trademark in its entirety and without alteration, with the sole addition of the letter ‘s’ at the end of the name, which, under settled UDRP panel jurisprudence, is irrelevant for purposes of the identity or confusing similarity analysis” and “[t]he transposition of letters in a trademark or the addition of adjacent letters constitutes a textbook case of typosquatting”.
• Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name because “Complainant has not granted the Respondent any license, authorization, or permission to use the MALAGACAR.COM trademark or to register any domain name incorporating that sign”; “[t]he Respondent is not, and has never been, associated or affiliated with the Complainant”; “Respondent has not used the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to receiving notice of this dispute” because “[o]n the contrary, after acquiring the domain name, the Respondent configured the redirection of Internet traffic from <malagacars.com> to the competing vehicle rental platform https://www.localrent.com/en/spain/malaga/, operated by Local Rent, thereby exploiting the Complainant’s goodwill and trademark recognition to divert customers to a competing service”; “Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name ‘malagacars’ and has not acquired any trademark rights in that designation”; “[t]he term ‘malagacars’ has no descriptive or generic meaning in relation to the Respondent’s actual business activity”; and “Respondent makes no legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name” because “[t]he redirection to a competing commercial website demonstrates an unequivocally commercial purpose, wholly inconsistent with any bona fide use”.
• The Disputed Domain Name was registered and is being used in bad faith because “[t]he term ‘malagacars’ is a distinctive combination with no independent generic or descriptive meaning: it refers specifically and exclusively to the Complainant’s trademark and business”; “[g]iven the Complainant’s well-established presence in the Málaga vehicle rental market, it is inconceivable that the original registrant could have registered or acquired <malagacars.com> without knowledge of the Complainant’s prior trademark rights”; “[t]he domain name’s history reveals that it remained inactive for a significant period after its original registration, a pattern characteristic of cybersquatting”; “the disputed domain name was configured to redirect traffic to https://www.localrent.com/en/spain/malaga/, an online vehicle rental portal that operates in direct competition with the Complainant in the Málaga market”, which “constitutes a paradigmatic example of bad faith use within the meaning of Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Policy”; and “consumer confusion is especially high” because “[t]he Complainant’s own customers habitually refer to its business as ‘malagacars.com’ in their online reviews and ratings, which demonstrates that the domain name functions as an identifier of the Complainant to consumers, as shown in the images submitted”, “[t]he website to which the domain name currently resolves offers vehicle rental services in Málaga without the operator’s name being clearly and immediately visible or identifiable to the average consumer, such that a user accessing <malagacars.com> expecting to find the Complainant’s website may, without realizing it, be dealing with an entirely different company and making a booking through a competing platform” and “[t]here is a high likelihood that actual bookings have been made through the website to which the Respondent’s domain name redirects by consumers who mistakenly believed they were dealing with the Complainant”.

B. Respondent

Respondent contends that Complainant has not satisfied all three of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the Disputed Domain Name. Notably, Respondent contends, in relevant part, that:

• “The Respondent acknowledges for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) only that <malagacars.com> is confusingly similar to the Complainant’s registered trademark MALAGACAR.COM (Spanish Trademark No. M2492788, Class 39).”
• Respondent has rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name because “[t]he disputed domain name consists of two elements: ‘Málaga’, a geographic name, and ‘Cars’, the generic English noun for motor vehicles”, which was “registered and used by the Respondent as a descriptive geographic travel domain consistent with his established global portfolio strategy”; redirecting the Disputed Domain Name to “a mainstream car rental booking platform […] constitutes a bona fide offering of goods or services in connection with the domain name’s descriptive geographic meaning, well before any notice of this dispute”; “investing in domain names consisting of generic or descriptive terms, including geographic terms, can constitute a legitimate interest under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy”; and a previous panel found that the registrant of a nearly identical domain name, <malaga-cars.com>, had rights or legitimate interests because “[t]he descriptive or generic use of ‘Malaga cars’ is not illegitimate, as it is a common English name for motor vehicles offered for rent in the Malaga area” (Respondent’s translation). Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L. v. ColDen Communications, Nova Hosting / Dragon Group, Tina Cross, WIPO Case No. D2012-0941.
• Respondent did not register or use the Disputed Domain Name in bad faith because “[a]s confirmed in the Respondent’s (Notarized) Declaration […], he had no knowledge of the Complainant or its trademark at the time of registration in August 2018”; and “[t]he redirect of <malagacars.com> to Localrent.com through the Travelpayouts affiliate account is the Respondent’s standard monetisation mechanism applied across his travel portfolio – not a scheme specific to this domain or directed at the Complainant”.
Respondent requests that the Panel enter a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”) because, in relevant part:
“The Complainant and Trebia Abogados brought WIPO-D2012-0941 against <malaga-cars.com> and lost on the ground that ‘Malaga cars’ is a descriptive/generic expression. The same legal firm now brings this Complaint against <malagacars.com>, a domain indistinguishable in its descriptive character. The Complainant has been on notice since 22 July 2012, (fourteen years) that a WIPO panel found ‘Malaga cars’ to be a legitimate geographic descriptor […].”
“The Complainant also failed to disclose prior UDRP WIPO-D2012-0941 in its Complaint, despite that proceeding being directly precedent on the central legal question in this case”.

6. Discussion and Findings

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar

Based upon the trademark registration cited by the Complainant, it is apparent that the Complainant has rights in and to the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark.

As to whether the Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark, the relevant comparison to be made is with the second-level portion of the Disputed Domain Name only (i.e., “malagacars”) because “[t]he applicable Top-Level Domain (‘TLD’) in a domain name (e.g., ‘.com’, ‘.club’, ‘.nyc’) is viewed as a standard registration requirement and as such is disregarded under the first element confusing similarity test”. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.11.1. However, the Panel is also mindful of this language from WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.11.1: “Where the applicable TLD and the second-level portion of the domain name in combination contain the relevant trademark, panels may consider the domain name in its entirety for purposes of assessing confusing similarity (e.g., for a hypothetical TLD ‘.mark’ and a mark ‘TRADEMARK’, the domain name <trade.mark> would be confusingly similar for UDRP standing purposes).” This latter quotation refers generally to situations in which a disputed domain name’s top-level domain name forms a part of the trademark (as in <b.mw>, which was found to be confusingly similar to the trademark BMW in Bayerische Motoren Werke AG v. Masakazu/Living By Blue Co., Ltd., WIPO Case No. DMW2015-0001). Here, however, the issue is not whether to consider the top-level portion of the Disputed Domain Name, but whether to disregard the top-level domain that appears in the relevant trademark. It’s an unusual but not difficult issue, for the reasons set forth below.

As set forth in section 1.7 of WIPO Overview 3.1: The test for confusing similarity “typically involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the disputed domain name […]. Although each case is judged on its own merits, in cases where a domain name incorporates the entirety of a trademark, or where at least a dominant feature of the relevant mark is recognizable in the domain name, the domain name will normally be considered confusingly similar to that mark”. Here, regardless of whether the Panel considers the top-level domain in the Disputed Domain Name when comparing the Disputed Domain Name to the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark, it is apparent that the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark is recognizable in the Disputed Domain Name and that a dominant feature of the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark is recognizable in the Disputed Domain Name. Further, Respondent agrees that the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests

The Complainant has argued that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name because, inter alia, “Complainant has not granted the Respondent any license, authorization, or permission to use the MALAGACAR.COM trademark or to register any domain name incorporating that sign”; “[t]he Respondent is not, and has never been, associated or affiliated with the Complainant”; “Respondent has not used the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services prior to receiving notice of this dispute” because “[o]n the contrary, after acquiring the domain name, the Respondent configured the redirection of Internet traffic from <malagacars.com> to the competing vehicle rental platform https://www.localrent.com/en/spain/malaga/, operated by Local Rent, thereby exploiting the Complainant’s goodwill and trademark recognition to divert customers to a competing service”; “Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name ‘malagacars’ and has not acquired any trademark rights in that designation”; “[t]he term ‘malagacars’ has no descriptive or generic meaning in relation to the Respondent’s actual business activity”; and “Respondent makes no legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name” because “[t]he redirection to a competing commercial website demonstrates an unequivocally commercial purpose, wholly inconsistent with any bona fide use.”

WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.1, states: “Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the often impossible task of ‘proving a negative’, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element.”

The Panel finds that the Complainant has established its prima facie case. Accordingly, the Panel considers whether Respondent has presented relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. Specifically, the Panel considers whether Respondent’s use of the Disputed Domain Name is “in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services” (Policy, para. 4(c)(i)) and/or whether Respondent is “making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue” (Policy, para. 4(c)(iii)).

In many circumstances, using a disputed domain name that is confusingly similar to a complainant’s trademark in connection with the same goods or services associated with that trademark is not considered bona fide or fair. However, the facts of this proceeding are atypical because, despite Complainant’s registration of the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark, Respondent is using the Disputed Domain Name for its descriptive meaning. Further, while Complainant refers to the “renown” of the MALAGACAR.COM Trademark, Complainant has provided no evidence to support this statement or otherwise demonstrate that the trademark is well-known.

In a decision cited by Respondent, a three-member panel denied transfer of the domain name <guaranteedremoval.com> to the owner of what the panel considered to be a relevant trademark registration for GUARANTEED REMOVALS because the respondent provided documentation that it had used the domain name “to exploit its descriptive connotations and not to exploit any alleged trademark rights of Complainant”. Erase Technologies, LLC v. Web Presence LLC, NetReputation.com, WIPO Case No. D2022-3797. And, in another decision cited by Respondent, a three-member panel denied transfer of the domain name <holidaysinspain.travel> to the owner of the Spanish trademark HOLIDAYSINSPAIN.COM (among others) because “[i]n the United Kingdom, where the Respondent is domiciled, the phrase ‘holidays in Spain’ is merely descriptive”. Viajes Holidaysinspain.com, S.A. v. NORTAQ, Ltd., WIPO Case No. D2006- 1480.

This Panel considers the Erase Technologies and Viajes Holidaysinspain.com decisions directly relevant here. By using the Disputed Domain Name in connection with the descriptive meaning of the words that comprise it – that is, by redirecting a domain name containing the word “malaga” and “cars” to a website that offers car rental services in Malaga – Respondent has done nothing more than exploit the descriptive meaning of the Disputed Domain Name. This is both bona fide and fair.

Furthermore, the Panel agrees with Respondent that a previous UDRP decision in a case also filed by Complainant – which Complainant did not cite and, therefore, did not attempt to distinguish from the instant case – is especially relevant here. That case involved the domain name <malaga-cars.com>, which is the same as the Disputed Domain Name here other than the inclusion of a hyphen. The panel there wrote that “use of ‘Malaga cars’ in a descriptive or generic sense is not illegitimate, since it is a common name in English for the motor vehicles offered for rent in the Malaga area, the language in which the website is written under the disputed domain name” (unofficial translation). Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L. v. ColDen Communications, Nova Hosting / Dragon Group, Tina Cross, WIPO Case. No. D2012-0941.

The Panel finds the second element of the Policy has not been established.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

Whether a domain name is registered and used in bad faith for purposes of the Policy may be determined by evaluating four (non-exhaustive) factors set forth in the Policy: (i) circumstances indicating that the registrant has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in excess of the registrant’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or (ii) the registrant has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the registrant has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or (iii) the registrant has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or (iv) by using the domain name, the registrant has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to the registrant’s website or other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the registrant’s website or location or of a product or service on the registrant’s website or location. Policy, paragraph 4(b).

Here, Complainant argues that bad faith exists pursuant to paragraph 4(b)(iv) as a result of what it calls “a paradigmatic example of bad faith use” based on Respondent’s redirection of the Disputed Domain Name to the Local Rent website. As in the Panel’s discussion above with respect to rights or legitimate interests, the Panel acknowledges that registering a domain name containing a complainant’s trademark and then using it in connection with the same goods or services associated with the trademark will often create a likelihood of confusion and, therefore, bad faith. However, again, the facts here are not typical. In addition to the descriptive nature of the Disputed Domain Name, Respondent has provided a signed declaration in which he says: “The Domain Name was acquired because it represented a natural and commercially valuable combination of a major European tourist city, Malaga, Spain, with the English word ‘cars’, a generic descriptor for motor vehicle hire services. This combination fits precisely within my established portfolio strategy of registering geographic city names combined with generic travel service terms. At the time of registration in August 2018, I had no knowledge of the complainant’s identity, business, or Spanish trademark, and I was not aware of any operator using the ‘MalagaCar.com’.com as a brand identifier.”

Given the streamlined nature of proceedings under the Policy, the Panel is not in a position to question the veracity of Respondent’s declaration. Moreover, given the descriptive nature of the words that comprise the Disputed Domain Name, Respondent’s practice of registering tourism-related domain names that consist of a city name plus an activity, and Complainant’s registration of a single relevant trademark in a country other than where Respondent is located, Respondent’s declaration is credible. While the Panel recognizes that “domainers” such as Respondent may be required to exercise a higher duty of care, “the nature of the domain name” is especially relevant here. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.2.2.

As in its evaluation above of rights or legitimate interests, the Panel here is also persuaded by decisions cited by Respondent with respect to bad faith, including We Buy Cars (Pty) Limited v. Ray Thompson, WIPO Case No. D2026-1231 (finding no bad faith where respondent used disputed domain name <webuycarscashfast.com>, despite complainant’s WEBUYCARS trademark, because, among other things, “[t]he phrase ‘we buy cars’ is a straightforward description of a car-buying business and is the kind of expression that a person in the United States setting up such a business might naturally register, entirely independently and without any knowledge of a South African company using the same phrase in South Africa”).

The Panel finds that the Complainant has not established the third element of the Policy.

D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking

Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if after considering the submissions, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at RDNH or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. As set forth in WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.16:
Reasons articulated by panels for finding RDNH include: (i) facts which demonstrate that the complainant knew it could not succeed as to any of the required three elements – such as the complainant’s lack of relevant trademark rights, clear knowledge of respondent rights or legitimate interests, or clear knowledge of a lack of respondent bad faith… such as registration of the disputed domain name well before the complainant acquired trademark rights, (ii) facts which demonstrate that the complainant clearly ought to have known it could not succeed under any fair interpretation of facts reasonably available prior to the filing of the complaint, including relevant facts on the website at the disputed domain name or readily available public sources such as the WhoIs [RDAP] database, (iii) unreasonably ignoring established Policy precedent notably as captured in this WIPO Overview – except in limited circumstances which prima facie justify advancing an alternative legal argument, (iv) the provision of false evidence, or otherwise attempting to mislead the panel, (v) the provision of intentionally incomplete material evidence – often clarified by the respondent, (vi) the complainant’s failure to disclose that a case is a UDRP refiling, (vii) filing the complaint after an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the disputed domain name from the respondent without a plausible legal basis, (viii) basing a complaint on only the barest of allegations without any supporting evidence.

As stated twice above, this is an unusual case given that, at first glance, it appears appropriate for the Policy in light of the facts that Complainant owns a trademark registration, the Disputed Domain Name is nearly identical to the trademark and Respondent uses the Disputed Domain Name in connection with the same goods or services associated with the trademark. But, of course, the descriptive nature of the Disputed Domain Name means that it is a very weak trademark, and Complainant presented no evidence that Respondent knew, or should have known, of the trademark when it registered the Disputed Domain Name. Complainant provided no documentation regarding the strength of the trademark or any action by Respondent regarding its awareness of the trademark.

Further, Complainant knew – and did not disclose – that it had lost a previous proceeding under the Policy involving an almost identical domain name and facts. Bardón y Rufo 67, S.L. v. ColDen Communications, Nova Hosting / Dragon Group, Tina Cross, WIPO Case No. D2012-0941. While Complainant was not obligated to disclose this decision in its Complaint, it should have done so and attempted to argue why it might be distinguishable from the instant proceeding.

Despite the foregoing, the Panel recognizes that many decisions evaluating the applicability of RDNH have concluded that it is applicable where it is apparent that the complaint should not have been filed in the first instance because it was obvious that there was no likelihood of success. See, e.g., Philip Savino v. Cykon Technology Limited, WIPO Case No. D2020-1156 (“the Complaint should never have been filed” because of “the long period of several years between the registration of the disputed domain name and subsequent commencement of use of the trademark by the Complainant”); Energysquare v. Management Team, Easy Property, WIPO Case No. D2021-1219 (“[t]he Complaint should never have been filed” where “by the time the Respondent was the registrant of the disputed domain name the Complainant was not even founded”); and Majid Al Futtaim Properties LLC v. Ayman Bajnaid, WIPO Case No. D2022-4130 (finding RDNH where the complaint contained “feeble arguments”, “seriously overstates its case in many respects” and contained a statement that was “completely false and is not supported by and is contrary to all the evidence”).

Here, despite the weaknesses in the Complaint and the Panel’s decision in this case, the Panel does not conclude that the Complainant should not have been filed. As a result, the Panel does not find that the Complaint has been brought in bad faith in an attempt at RDNH.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

Douglas M. Isenberg
Presiding Panelist

José Carlos Erdozain
Panelist

Nick J. Gardner
Panelist

Date: September 10, 2026

This case is a reminder that a Respondent can win a UDRP without winning the argument it fought hardest for. The Complainant, Semify, LLC, held an incontestable US registration for SEMIFY predating the disputed domain’s acquisition by over five years, and the Respondent, a professional domain investor who acquired <semify.ai> for USD 244.96 as one of five “.ai” names purchased in a single transaction, leaned heavily on a portmanteau theory positioning “Semify” as “semi” (semiconductor) plus “-fy,” bolstered by extensive evidence of the SEMI prefix’s ubiquity across the semiconductor and AI industries. The three-member Panel was unpersuaded by that theory, holding that the ability to segment a word into components does not, without more, establish an “established descriptive meaning,” and finding no evidence that “Semify” itself was commonly understood in that manner. The Complaint nonetheless failed on the narrowest of margins under the third element: the Complainant’s AI optimization service launched 31 days after the disputed domain’s registration, the domain was part of a broader, unsolicited multi-domain acquisition, and there was no evidence the Respondent ever approached the Complainant. The Panel went on to decline a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, characterizing the case as “finely balanced” despite acknowledging the Complaint’s assertions of exclusivity were “expressed too broadly.” Continue reading the full decision below. 

Semify, LLC v. James Booth, DomainBooth.com, Case No. DAI2026-0053

1. The Parties
The Complainant is Semify, LLC, United States of America (“United States”), represented by Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c., United States.

The Respondent is James Booth, DomainBooth.com, United Arab Emirates, represented by Cylaw Solutions, India.

2. The Domain Name and RegistrarThe disputed domain name <semify.ai> is registered with Namecheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 10, 2026. On June 11, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On June 12, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name that differed from the named Respondent (Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on the same day, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on June 17, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on June 25, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was July 15, 2026. The Respondent sent email communications to the Center on July 11, 2026, and on July 13, 2026. The Response due date was extended to July 19, 2026, as per the Respondent’s request pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of the Rules. The Response was filed with the Center on July 18, 2026.

The Center appointed Jane Seager, Reyes Campello Estebaranz, and Gerald M. Levine as panelists in this matter on August 20, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

4.1. The Complainant
The Complainant is a company located in Rochester, New York, United States. The Complainant provides white-label digital marketing services, including search engine optimization (“SEO”), advertising and marketing services, pay-per-click (“PPC”) services, Software as a Service (“SaaS”), and AI-driven SEO services.

The Complainant has used the domain name <semify.com> since at least 2020.
In December 2025, the Complainant announced its acquisition of Dragon Metrics, an SEO and AI reporting platform. The Complainant’s AI optimization service was publicly launched on May 11, 2026.

4.2. The Complainant’s Trademark Rights
The Complainant owns United States Trademark Registration No. 6,149,129, SEMIFY, registered on September 8, 2020.

The Complaint also refers to United States Trademark Application Serial No. 99/470,883 for SEMIFY, filed on October 30, 2025, covering, among other things, marketing services using AI and SaaS services using AI tools for search engine optimization.

4.3. The Respondent
The Respondent, James Booth, is based in Ajman, United Arab Emirates, and is the sole owner and principal of DomainBooth FZE LLC. The Respondent is engaged in the acquisition, holding, brokerage, and resale of domain names, particularly generic, descriptive, brandable, and short-character domain names, including “.com” and “.ai” domain names.

4.4. The Disputed Domain Name
The Respondent acquired the disputed domain name on April 10, 2026, for USD 244.96. It was acquired as one of five “.ai” domain names in a single transaction with a total purchase price of USD 5,539.80.

The disputed domain name redirects to a page on the Atom.com domain name marketplace where it is offered for sale for USD 149,995.

There is no evidence in the record of correspondence between the Parties prior to the filing of the Complaint.

5. Parties’ Contentions
A. Complainant
The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

The Complainant asserts rights in the trademark SEMIFY. The Complainant emphasizes that it owns an incontestable United States trademark registration for SEMIFY, has used the mark since at least 2020, and claims that SEMIFY is a coined and distinctive term associated exclusively with the Complainant. The Complainant contends that the disputed domain name wholly incorporates the Complainant’s SEMIFY trademark. The Complainant argues that the addition of the country code Top-Level Domain (“ccTLD”) “.ai” does not distinguish the disputed domain name from the Complainant’s trademark. The Complainant submits that the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to its SEMIFY trademark.
The Complainant submits that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name. The Complainant asserts that it has not authorized the Respondent to use the SEMIFY trademark, contends that the Respondent is not known by the name “Semify”, and argues that there is no evidence of any legitimate commercial or noncommercial use of the disputed domain name by the Respondent. The Complainant stresses that “Semify” is not a dictionary term. The Complainant submits that the only use of the disputed domain name is to offer it for sale at an exorbitant price, which does not constitute a legitimate interest.

The Complainant further submits that the disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith. The Complainant asserts that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name after the Complainant had established trademark rights and publicly announced its intention to offer AI-related services under the SEMIFY mark. The Complainant contends that the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant and its rights in the SEMIFY trademark at the time of registration. The Complainant submits that the timing of the registration, the use of the ccTLD “.ai”, and the categorization of the disputed domain name under “Marketing & Advertising” when offering the disputed domain name for sale indicate that the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant’s trademark rights and registered the disputed domain name to capitalize on the value and goodwill associated with the SEMIFY mark. The Complainant argues that the Respondent’s sole use of the disputed domain name is to offer it for sale at a price far exceeding its estimated value, which the Complainant submits is a textbook example of cybersquatting and bad faith registration and use.
The Complainant requests transfer of the disputed domain name.

B. Respondent
The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.
The Respondent acknowledges, solely for purposes of the proceeding, that the Complainant holds a trademark registration for SEMIFY and therefore satisfies the threshold requirement under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent stresses that this concession does not constitute an admission as to the strength, distinctiveness, or scope of the Complainant’s rights.
The Respondent argues that “Semify” is not a coined term exclusively associated with the Complainant. Rather, the Respondent asserts that it is a descriptive or suggestive portmanteau capable of several meanings, including “SEM” and “-ify”, referring to search engine marketing; “semi” and “-fy”, referring to semiconductors; and a combination of “seminar” and “simplify.”
The Respondent notes that the Complainant’s own press releases describe “Semify” as a reference to search engine marketing (“SEM”) and use the term as a verb in connection with the provision of such services. The Respondent further notes that unrelated parties in several countries have used “Semify” in connection with marketing, semiconductor engineering, structural equation modelling, information technology, and other activities, in some cases before the Complainant adopted the name. The Respondent argues that these facts demonstrate that the term is descriptive or suggestive and is not exclusively distinctive of the Complainant.

The Respondent argues that it has rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because it operates an established domain name investment and brokerage business that acquires, holds, and resells generic, descriptive, and brandable domain names. The Respondent asserts that domain name investment is a legitimate commercial activity where the domain name was not acquired to target a trademark owner.
The Respondent states that it acquired the disputed domain name on April 10, 2026, as one of five brandable “.ai” domain names purchased in a single transaction. The Respondent notes that it already held several domain names employing the “-ify” or “-fy” naming pattern. According to the Respondent, these circumstances demonstrate a consistent investment strategy unrelated to the Complainant.
The Respondent asserts that the disputed domain name was acquired for its inherent commercial value as a short, brandable portmanteau, particularly as a combination of “semi”, referring to semiconductors, and “-fy”, used with the ccTLD “.ai”. The Respondent also relies on the term’s other possible meanings and its use by unrelated third parties to argue that the disputed domain name has value independent of the Complainant’s trademark.
The Respondent further argues that offering the disputed domain name for sale does not, by itself, negate a legitimate interest. The Respondent notes that the disputed domain name was listed on an open marketplace and was not offered specifically to the Complainant. The Respondent asserts that the asking price of USD 149,995 was consistent with the prices of comparable names in its portfolio and with reported premium “.ai” domain name sales, rather than being based on the Complainant’s trademark.
The Respondent argues that the Complainant has failed to show that the disputed domain name was registered or used to target the Complainant or its trademark. The Respondent denies having known of the Complainant, its trademark, or its pending AI-related trademark application when registering the disputed domain name.
The Respondent asserts that the Complainant is a regional, white-label B2B SEO reseller based in the United States, with no demonstrated presence, customers, reputation, or brand recognition in the United Arab Emirates, where the Respondent is based. The Respondent argues that constructive notice of the Complainant’s trademark is insufficient under the Policy and that the Complainant has produced no evidence of the Respondent’s actual knowledge of the Complainant’s trademark.
The Respondent notes that the Complainant’s AI optimization service was publicly launched on May 11, 2026, 31 days after the disputed domain name was acquired. The Respondent therefore argues that it could not have acquired the disputed domain name to target that service. The Respondent also notes that the Complainant’s AI-related trademark application was filed on an intent-to-use basis and had not resulted in established use-based rights in AI services at the time of registration.
The Respondent asserts that it selected the ccTLD “.ai” because of the disputed domain name’s independent value at the intersection of semiconductors and AI, as well as the broader commercial demand for premium “.ai” domain names. The Respondent rejects the contention that the ccTLD itself demonstrates knowledge of the Complainant.
The Respondent further argues that the asking price does not establish bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent asserts that bad faith would require evidence that the disputed domain name was acquired primarily for sale to the Complainant or a competitor of the Complainant. Here, the disputed domain name was listed for sale generally, the Respondent never approached the Complainant, and the asking price was allegedly supported by comparable aftermarket listings and sales.
Finally, the Respondent argues that the disputed domain name’s inclusion in a “Marketing & Advertising” marketplace category does not demonstrate targeting. The Respondent asserts that this categorization reflects the descriptive meaning “SEM + ify” and notes that the disputed domain name also appeared in more than 20 other categories, including AI, technology, software, finance, consulting, and analytics.

The Respondent requests a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. The Respondent argues that, despite being represented by specialist counsel, the Complainant claimed that it had exclusively coined and used “Semify”, contrary to its own statements and evidence of third-party use. The Respondent further asserts that the Complainant alleged targeting of an AI service launched only after registration of the disputed domain name and relied principally on the public listing and asking price without producing evidence that the Respondent knew of or targeted the Complainant.

6. Discussion and Findings
In order to prevail, the Complainant must demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that it has satisfied the requirements of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy:
(i) The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;
(ii) The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and
(iii) The disputed domain name was registered and is being used in bad faith.

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar
It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant’s trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), section 1.7.
The Panel finds that the Complainant has established rights in the trademark SEMIFY for purposes of the Policy. The registration details of the Complainant’s trademark are set out in the factual background section above. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.2.1.
The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.7.
The Panel finds that the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests
Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.
Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of “proving a negative”, requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.1.
The Complainant has established that it has not authorized the Respondent to use the SEMIFY trademark and that the Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name. The disputed domain name redirects to a domain name marketplace page where it is offered for sale for USD 149,995.

Generally speaking, UDRP panels have accepted that aggregating and holding domain names (usually for resale) consisting, for example, of acronyms, dictionary words, common phrases, or unique/catchy or memorable terms (alone or in combination), can be bona fide and is not per se illegitimate under the UDRP where the respondent can show that the purpose of the registration was not to target a trademark. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.1. Merely characterizing a domain name as descriptive or “brandable”, however, does not automatically confer rights or legitimate interests. Panels assess such claims in light of the overall circumstances. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 2.10.1.
The Respondent relies principally on its established domain name investment and brokerage business and contends that it acquired the disputed domain name for its inherent value as a short and brandable portmanteau. The Respondent submits that “Semify” is capable of several meanings, including “SEM” and “-ify”, referring to search engine marketing; “semi” and “-fy”, referring to semiconductors; and a combination of “seminar” and “simplify”.
The Panel has reservations regarding the Respondent’s characterization of “Semify” as a portmanteau. The Respondent’s principal proposed constructions, “SEM + -ify” and “semi + -fy”, combine an acronym, abbreviation, or prefix with the suffix “-(i)fy”. The ability to divide a term into possible components does not, by itself, show that it is a portmanteau or possesses an established descriptive meaning.
Nor does the evidence show that “Semify” was commonly used or understood in the semiconductor or AI industries in the manner asserted in the Response. The proposed construction based on “seminar” and “simplify” derives from a description previously used by a domain name marketplace when advertising <semify.com> for sale, rather than from evidence of a generally understood meaning of the term.The Panel has also considered the evidence of third-party adoption or use of “Semify”, including uses relating to digital marketing, semiconductor engineering, structural equation modelling, IT, and retail. The fact that other parties may use “Semify” in the course of trade does not necessarily make the term descriptive. Nor does the apparent coexistence of multiple users of the term, without more, confer rights or legitimate interests on the Respondent in the disputed domain name.
The Respondent further relies on press releases issued in connection with the Complainant’s rebranding in 2020, which described “Semify” as a reference or “nod” to search engine marketing and used the term as a verb when explaining the Complainant’s services. Those statements explain the Complainant’s selection and promotion of the SEMIFY mark, but do not necessarily demonstrate ordinary third-party use of “Semify” as a descriptive term.
On the other hand, the Respondent has produced evidence relevant to its claimed rights or legitimate interests. In particular, it relies on its established domain name investment activities, its purchase of the disputed domain name as one of five “.ai” domain names in a single transaction, its portfolio of other “-ify” or “-fy” domain names, third-party uses of “Semify”, and the generalized nature of the offer for sale. There is no evidence that the Respondent approached the Complainant in an attempt to sell the disputed domain name directly to it.
The Parties’ competing submissions under the second element raise questions that overlap with the issue of trademark targeting under the third element. In light of the Panel’s conclusion below that the Complainant has not established that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith, it is unnecessary for the Panel to reach a conclusion under the second element of the Policy.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith
Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances evidencing the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

Under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy, bad faith may be found where circumstances indicate that a respondent registered or acquired a domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the complainant, or to a competitor of the complainant, for valuable consideration exceeding the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name.
The Complainant’s registered rights in the SEMIFY trademark predate the Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed domain name by more than five years. The Complainant’s later application covering AI-related services and the subsequent launch of its AI optimization service do not affect those earlier rights. They are nevertheless relevant to the Complainant’s contention that the Respondent selected the “.ai” ccTLD to target its AI-related activities. In this regard, the Complainant announced its acquisition of Dragon Metrics before the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name but launched its AI optimization service only after the acquisition.
Several circumstances support the Complainant’s case. The disputed domain name is identical to the SEMIFY trademark; it was acquired after the Complainant had established its rights and announced the Dragon Metrics acquisition; it was included in a “Marketing & Advertising” category on the Respondent’s marketplace; and it was offered for USD 149,995 after having been acquired for USD 244.96.
Prior panels have recognized that, given the global reach of the Internet and search engines, knowledge of a complainant’s trademark may be inferred where the mark is widely known or highly specific and the respondent cannot credibly claim to have been unaware of it, particularly where the respondent is a professional domain name investor. Relevant factors may include the nature of the domain name, the chosen Top-Level Domain, its use, and the respondent’s registration pattern. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.2.2.
Prior panels have also recognized that professional domain name investors, particularly those undertaking bulk or automated registrations, have an affirmative obligation to avoid trademark-abusive registrations. A deliberate failure to screen acquisitions against readily available online sources may, depending on the circumstances, support a finding of wilful blindness. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 3.2.3.
The Respondent has not provided evidence that it conducted trademark screening or other due diligence before acquiring the disputed domain name. A basic Internet or trademark search for “Semify” would likely have revealed the Complainant’s website and United States trademark registration. Given the Respondent’s experience as a professional domain name investor, the absence of evidence of screening weighs against it. In the circumstances of this case, however, that fact does not provide a sufficient basis to infer that the Respondent knew of and targeted the Complainant when acquiring the disputed domain name.
The Complainant has not submitted evidence regarding the extent of the SEMIFY mark’s reputation at the relevant time, such as evidence of sales, advertising, market share, website traffic, customer reach, or broader recognition. Although the Complainant maintained an established online presence at the domain name <semify.com>, the record does not show that its trademark was widely known internationally. The Respondent’s location in the United Arab Emirates does not preclude a finding of knowledge, particularly given the international nature of its business, but the Complainant’s online presence does not itself establish that the Respondent knew of the Complainant or targeted its trademark.
The evidence of unrelated uses of “Semify” in several jurisdictions and fields also weighs against inferring the Respondent’s knowledge and targeting of the Complainant solely from the composition of the disputed domain name. In addition, the disputed domain name was acquired as one of five “.ai” domain names in a single transaction. The Respondent has an established domain name investment business and owns other names employing the “-ify” or “-fy” naming pattern. These circumstances provide a plausible context for the acquisition of the disputed domain name unrelated to the Complainant.

As discussed under the preceding element, the Panel has reservations regarding the Respondent’s proposed semiconductor-related interpretation of “Semify”. The Respondent has not shown that the term has a commonly recognized meaning in the semiconductor or AI industries. The weakness of that explanation, however, does not establish the Complainant’s competing allegation of trademark targeting.
While the disputed domain name’s inclusion in the “Marketing & Advertising” category corresponds to the Complainant’s field of activity, its appearance in numerous other categories and the possible interpretation of “SEM” as an abbreviation for search engine marketing reduce the weight of that evidence as an indicator that the Respondent was aware of and targeted the Complainant.

The Panel has also considered the Respondent’s offer to sell the disputed domain name for USD 149,995. The difference between the acquisition cost and asking price is substantial. Paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy, however, requires circumstances indicating that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant or a competitor of the Complainant. In this case, the disputed domain name was offered generally through an open marketplace. There is no evidence that the Respondent approached the Complainant, referred to it in the listing, or otherwise directed the offer to the Complainant or one of its competitors. The Respondent has also produced evidence of substantial prices for other domain names in its portfolio and of reported high-value sales of other “.ai” domain names.

The exact match with the SEMIFY trademark, the chronology of the Complainant’s rights, the Respondent’s professional status, the absence of evidence of trademark screening, the marketplace categorization, and the substantial asking price weigh in the Complainant’s favour. Those circumstances must be weighed against the limited evidence regarding the extent of the SEMIFY mark’s reputation, the evidence of third-party uses of “Semify”, the Respondent’s established investment activities, the multi-domain name acquisition, its portfolio of similarly composed domain names, the generalized offer for sale, and the absence of any communication directed to the Complainant.
Having considered the evidence as a whole, the Panel finds that the Complainant narrowly fails to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Respondent knew of and targeted the Complainant or its SEMIFY trademark when acquiring the disputed domain name. Nor has the Complainant established that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the Complainant or a competitor of the Complainant within the meaning of paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy.
The Panel therefore finds that the Complainant has not sufficiently established that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith. As paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy requires both registration and use in bad faith, it is unnecessary for the Panel to reach a separate conclusion regarding bad faith use.
The Panel finds that the Complainant has failed to establish the third element of the Policy.
D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking
Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if after considering the submissions, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. The mere lack of success in the complaint is not, on its own, sufficient to constitute Reverse Domain Name Hijacking. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.16.
The Panel has considered the Respondent’s request for a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking, including the fact that the Complainant is represented by experienced counsel. The Panel acknowledges that the Complaint included certain assertions that were expressed too broadly, notably as to the exclusive association of “Semify” with the Complainant.
Nevertheless, the Panel is far from considering that this is a “textbook example of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking”, as claimed by the Respondent. The Complainant holds a trademark registration for SEMIFY that predates the Respondent’s acquisition of the disputed domain name by more than five years, and the disputed domain name is identical to that trademark. Furthermore, according to the WIPO Global Brand Database, the Complainant is the sole owner of subsisting trademark rights in the term “semify”. The

circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s acquisition and subsequent offer for sale of the disputed domain name provided a reasonable basis for the Complainant to pursue the matter under the Policy.
The Panel considers that the case was finely balanced, with the Respondent prevailing only narrowly on the basis that the evidence fell short of establishing bad faith registration on the balance of probabilities.
The Panel therefore declines to make a finding of Reverse Domain Name Hijacking.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

Jane Seager
(Presiding Panelist)

Reyes Campello Estebaranz
(Panelist)

Gerald M. Levine
(Panelist)

Date: September 7, 2026

The Complainants, a US-based jiu-jitsu and combat sports apparel brand operating under the HYPERFLY mark since 2011, filed a UDRP complaint against UAE-based professional domain investor James Booth over the domain <hyperfly.ai>, registered in November 2025 and listed for sale at a six-figure price. The Complainants argued that the Respondent — as a sophisticated domain investor — must have been aware of their well-known mark before registration, and that the for-sale listing at prices far exceeding registration cost constituted bad faith under paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy. The Panel found otherwise. The single most persuasive piece of evidence was a bulk purchase receipt showing that <hyperfly.ai> was acquired as one of twenty premium .ai domain names in a single transaction for a combined total of USD $8,628.20 — a circumstance far more consistent with a portfolio investment strategy than with deliberate targeting of the Complainants. The Panel also accepted the Respondent’s evidence of multiple unrelated third-party uses of “HyperFly” across AI, water sports, pharmaceuticals, aviation, and marketing — confirming that the term is not exclusively associated with the Complainants — and noted that the Respondent’s consistent pattern of investing in hyper-prefixed .ai domain names further supported the absence of any targeting intent.

On the hotly contested pricing issue — which generated multiple supplemental filings from both sides — the Panel accepted the Respondent’s documentary evidence showing that the price increase on Atom.com had occurred on May 18, 2026, before the Complaint was filed, rather than in response to it, effectively disposing of the Complainants’ central supplemental argument. The Complainants’ case ultimately rested on the inherent distinctiveness of the HYPERFLY mark and a Google search argument — that a sophisticated investor would inevitably have searched the term and found the Complainants’ brand — but the Panel found this insufficient to establish targeting in the absence of any direct evidence of the Respondent’s awareness or any contact between the parties prior to filing. While the Panel declined to find Reverse Domain Name Hijacking given the Complainants’ long-standing trademark registrations and pro se status, the Complaint was denied in its entirety and the domain remains with the Respondent.

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DO OR DIE, INC. d/b/a HYPERFLY, Pascal Pakter, Kerstin Pakter v. James Booth , DomainBooth.com, WIPO Case No. DAI2026-0042

1. The Parties

The Complainants are DO OR DIE, INC. d/b/a HYPERFLY, Pascal Pakter, Kerstin Pakter, United States of America (“United States”), represented by themselves.

The Respondent is James Booth, DomainBooth.com, United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), represented by Cylaw Solutions, India.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <hyperfly.ai> is registered with NameCheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on June 2, 2026. On June 2, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On June 2, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (Privacy service provided by Withheld for Privacy ehf) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainants on June 3, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainants to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainants filed an amended Complaint on June 5, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on June 5, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was June 25, 2026. On June 16, 2026, the Respondent requested the automatic four calendar day extension for response. On June 18, 2026, the Center granted the automatic four calendar day extension for response under paragraph 5(b) of the Rules. The Response was filed with the Center on June 20, 2026.

The Center received an unsolicited supplemental filing on June 23, 2026, and further email communications from the Complainants on June 26, 27 and 30, and July 2 ,7, 9, 2026. The Center received email communications from the Respondent on June 16, 30, and July 1 and 2, 2026. The Respondent submitted a Supplemental Filing on July 22 and 31, 2026.

The Center appointed Luca Barbero, Gerald M. Levine and Deanna Wong Wai Man as panelists in this matter on July 22, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. Each member of the Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

On July 25, 2026, the Complainant submitted a Second Supplemental Filing.

Following the Respondent’s nomination of Mr. Levine to be a member of this Panel, the Complainants requested the Center consider whether replacement or recusal was appropriate on the alleged grounds that Mr. Levine had a professional relationship with the Respondent’s counsel. Panelists have a duty pursuant to Rule 7 to disclose any facts “that could give rise to justified doubt as to the impartiality or independence of the Panelist.” The “ultimate arbiter on this question” of recusal is the nominee. Teaching Company, LLC, d/b/a The Great Courses v. Brendhan Hight, Marchex Sales, LLC, WIPO Claim No. D2014-0448.

In any event, the issue was put to rest by the Respondent’s supplemental submission in responding to the Complainants’ allegations of Mr. Levine’s alleged relationship. It stated without response from the Complainants: “Counsel recommended Mr. Levine on the basis of nearly a decade of studying his published treatise . . . . Professional admiration for published scholarship is an entirely legitimate basis for a nomination recommendation in any jurisdiction. The final nomination decision was the Respondent’s, not counsel’s.”

The Panel here by its two other members notes its concurrence with the two other members in Teaching Company, supra: “One of the reasons a UDRP party is given the opportunity to request (at additional expense) a three-member panel is to include a panelist likely to sympathize with each party’s desired interpretation of an issue of Policy precedent [. . .]. Following that election in this case, the Complainant presumably exercised that same opportunity at least in part for the same reasons when nominating its panelist choices”.

4. Factual Background

The Complaint has been filed in the name of DO OR DIE, INC. d/b/a HYPERFLY (“the first Complainant”), Pascal Pakter and Kerstin Pakter (“the Second and Third Complainants”).
The first Complainant is the operating entity that uses the HYPERFLY mark in commerce and is the registered owner of domain names encompassing the HYPERFLY mark. The Second and Third Complainants are the owners of the first Complainant and the record co-owners of trademark registrations for HYPERFLY in the United States and other jurisdictions.

HYPERFLY is an established and widely recognized performance apparel brand in the grappling and combat sports categories. Particularly, the trademark HYPERFLY has been used in connection with the production and sale of technical performance apparel, sportswear, training equipment, footwear, and headgear.

HYPERFLY products have been the subject of brand collaborations with the National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), Jordan Brand, Carhartt WIP, Champion and Godzilla. HYPERFLY licensed apparel has appeared on globally recognized athletes, including Shohei Ohtani.

HYPERFLY products are sold through the e-commerce site at <hyperfly.com>, authorized retailers, and brand academies and partners.

The Second and Third Complainants are co-owners, amongst others, of the following trademark registrations:

– United States trademark registration No. 4138095 for HYPERFLY (word mark), filed on August 3, 2011, and registered on May 8, 2012, in international class 25;
– United States trademark registration No. 5996879 for HYPERFLY (word mark), filed on August 2, 2019, and registered on February 25, 2020, in international class 35;
– United States trademark registration No. 5997071 for HYPERFLY (word mark), filed on August 5, 2019, and registered on February 25, 2020, in international class 28;
– International trademark registration No. 1492429 for HYPERFLY (word mark), registered on August 5, 2019, in classes 25 and 28, designating and protected in India, New Zealand and Russian Federation;
– Japanese trademark registration No. 6086956 for HYPERFLY (word mark), filed on December 20, 2017, and registered on October 5, 2018, in class 25.

The three Complainants are the co-owners of the European Union trademark registration No. 014887574 for HYPERFLY (word mark), filed on December 4, 2015, and registered on September 27, 2016, in classes 25 and 28.

The third Complainant is the owner of more than 30 HYPERFLY-formative domain names, including <hyperfly.com>, registered on June 4, 1999, and used in connection with the primary website dedicated to the HYPERFLY brand and products.

The Respondent is a domain investment and brokerage company based in UAE specializing in generic, descriptive, brandable, and short-character domain names with a particular focus on premium .com and premium .ai domain names.

The disputed domain name <hyperfly.ai> was registered on November 22, 2025, and is redirected to an internal page of the website “www.atom.com” (“the Atom.com website”), where it is offered for sale at USD$149,995. Prior to this proceeding, it was offered at USD $89,995 on the Atom.com website and at USD $99,995 on the Spaceship SellerHub and Namecheap aftermarket.

5. Parties’ Contentions

A. Complainants

The Complainants contend that they have satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

Notably, the Complainants contend that the disputed domain name is identical to the trademark HYPERFLY in which they have registered trademark rights.

The Complainants state that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name since:
i) the Respondent’s parking of the disputed domain name for resale at a six-figure asking price does not amount to a bona fide offering of goods or services;
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ii) the Respondent does not own trademark registrations for HYPERFLY and has not been commonly known by the disputed domain name;
iii) the disputed domain name, being offered for sale, is not being used for legitimate noncommercial or fair use;
iv) registration in the .ai country-code Top Level Domain (“ccTLD”), which is commonly interpreted as an acronym of “Artificial Intelligence” (“AI”), does not provide an inherent business rationale considering the Respondent has not used the disputed domain name in connection with a AI-related project and, should it be the case, this would “face the existence” of the Complainants’ prior rights on HYPERFLY in class 35 for “online retail services”; and
v) the Complainants have not authorized the Respondent’s use of HYPERFLY and have no relationship whatsoever with it.

The Complainants also submit that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith because:

i) the Respondent’s offers of the disputed domain name for sale on domain name marketplaces for amounts of USD $89,995 on the Atom.com website and at USD $99,995 on the Spaceship and Namecheap interfaces suggest that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name for the purpose of selling it at an amount exceeding the out-of-pocket costs according to paragraph 4(b)(i) of the Policy;
ii) the Respondent had constructive and actual knowledge of the Complainants’ rights at the time of registration, in view of the Complainants’ prior use of the HYPERFLY mark in commerce for over fourteen years, the Complainants’ prior trademark registrations and domain names, the use of the <hyperfly.com> domain name since 2011 and the media coverage related to the HYPERFLY mark;
iii) the Respondent targeted the Complainants’ trademark since the disputed domain name exactly reproduces the HYPERFLY mark, which is an inherently distinctive composite mark with no descriptive meaning as applied to apparel, training services, retail services, or any of the goods or services covered by Complainants’ trademark registrations;
iv) considering the Respondent is a professional domain investor, it had heightened duty of trademark due diligence before registering a domain name and no reasonable basis exists on which the Respondent could claim it was unaware that HYPERFLY is a registered trademark when it registered the disputed domain name on November 22, 2025M
v) the Respondent’s use of a privacy proxy to conceal its identity supports a finding of bad faith;
vi) the Respondent’s selection of the .ai ccTLD, in light of HYPERFLY’s commercial expansion into technical performance athletic apparel and the Complainants’ registered trademark rights for HYPERFLY for online retail registration in class 35, further demonstrates the Respondent’s bad faith; and
vii) the Respondent was involved as respondent in prior UDRP cases which were concluded with a denial of the complaints, but the circumstances in those cases where different from the ones in the case at hand since they involved a three-letter generic combination, a dictionary word and a domain name predating the complainant’s rights.

The Complainants further claim that the Respondent is using the disputed domain name in bad faith since:
i) the Respondent is passively holding the disputed domain name and such circumstance demonstrates the Respondent’s bad faith in light of the distinctiveness of the HYPERFLY mark, the lack of evidence of any actual or contemplated good-faith or legitimate use and the Respondent’s concealment of its identity;
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ii) the act of offering the disputed domain name for sale on multiple marketplaces amounts to bad faith use; and
iii) the Respondent, by redirecting the disputed domain name to a marketplace listing offering the disputed domain name for sale, is exploiting the goodwill in the Complainants’ mark to attract Internet traffic for commercial gain.

B. Respondent

The Respondent contends that the Complainants have not satisfied the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

The Respondent acknowledges, solely for the purposes of this proceeding, that the Complainants hold registered trademark rights in HYPERFLY and therefore satisfy the threshold requirement under paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy. However, the Respondent submits that the Complainants have failed to demonstrate the second and third requirement.

Particularly, the Respondent claims it has legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because:

i) the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name since it is a short, pronounceable, evocative combination of two ordinary English words with substantial independent commercial appeal across multiple industries, suitable for investment and resale;
ii) the Respondent has been engaged in domain investment for over a decade, and its investment strategy has consistently focused on premium .com and .ai domain names formed from dictionary words or common-word combinations, including strings built around “hyper” and “fly”, a clear and consistent pattern of investment in comparable linguistic combinations;
iii) the disputed domain name was acquired, for USD $202.96, as part of a single bulk portfolio transaction in which the Respondent purchased twenty premium .ai domain names for USD $8,628.20 in total. The other domain names acquired in the same transaction include numerous other two-word combinations (<mindbuddy.ai>, <neuroforge.ai>, <microdev.ai>, <blackmoth.ai>, <digitalweb.ai>, <eview.ai>, <firstbank.ai>, <baycare.ai>, <lifenote.ai>, <supersend.ai>, <growthhero.ai>, <wisehire.ai> and <jobtrack.ai>).
iv) the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name with the intention of reselling it to a third party who recognized the value of the same for a new business venture, most likely in artificial intelligence, technology, or web-based services – the natural commercial home of the .ai ccTLD. Following acquisition, the Respondent listed the disputed domain name on the Atom.com website – the standard channel for premium .ai aftermarket sales. The Respondent submits that the parking page has been auto-generated by the platform on the basis of the disputed domain name itself and that every premium listing on the Atom.com website follows the identical template: the marketplace algorithmically renders a logo from the second level domain, applies its standard ‘AI’ visual treatment, and inserts a fixed-price offer;
v) “Hyperfly” is a common-word composite with multiple independent uses by third parties globally in contexts entirely unrelated to the Complainants. Particularly, there were earlier third-party trademark filings for or including HYPERFLY and “HyperFly” is currently in active commercial use by numerous unrelated parties across multiple industries across AI, water sports, pharma, aviation, and marketing (none of it connected to the Complainants);
vi) the Respondent has never been found to be a cybersquatter or to have registered any domain name in bad faith and professional domain investing is expressly endorsed as a bona fide commercial enterprise under WIPO Overview 3.1, sections 2.1 and 2.10.

The Respondent states that the Complainants have failed to demonstrate that the Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because:

i) the Complainants have not provided evidence that the Respondent intended to target the Complainants’ mark, and particularly that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name primarily for the purpose of selling it to the Complainants;
ii) HYPERFLY is not inherently distinctive, being a combination of two ordinary English words, both extensively documented in dictionaries, embedded in the technical vocabulary of AI and machine learning, and both used by numerous unrelated third parties across multiple industries;
iii) the Respondent had no actual or constructive knowledge of the Complainants’ mark at the time of registration, since the Respondent is a UAE-based domain investor specializing in premium .com and .ai brandable strings while the Complainants are a US-based jiu-jitsu apparel brand with no trademark registration in class 42, no presence in artificial intelligence or technology and no trademark registration and commercial activity in UAE;
iv) Google searches for “HyperFly AI” or “Hyper fly ai” return results relating to “Hyperfly Developers, HyperFly AI on Hyperliquid, hyperfy.ai, VML Health Platforms, CloseBi.AI, hyperfi.ai, Xiaomi HyperAI, HyperFlow AI, HyperComply, and the ThemeForest aviation template, but not the Complainants”, and the Respondent’s own listing of the disputed domain name on the Atom.com website in fact surfaces in the search results ahead of any reference to the Complainants;
v) the Complainants’ product line is “technical” only in the fabric-science sense, as the Complainants have no software product, no AI tool, no Software as Service (SaaS) offering, no wearable technology, and no commercial presence of any kind in the AI or computing field;
vi) the Telstra passive-holding doctrine does not apply in this case since there has been no bad faith registration and the HYPERFLY mark is niche US-centric with no global notoriety, there being evidence of plausible good-faith use of “HyperFly” by unrelated parties across multiple industries, particularly the AI/technology field;
vii) the Respondent’s use of a proxy service does not amount to bad faith since it is the default offering of the registrar, used by millions worldwide for legitimate privacy reasons.

The Respondent requests that the Panel declare that the Complaint constitutes Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”) for the following reasons:

i) the Complainants have made material misstatements, including claiming the continuous use since 2011 of the domain name <hyperfly.com>, which is contradicted by the post-July 2020 wayback record annexed to the Complaint;
ii) the Complainants advanced the bad-faith theory that asking-price multiples of registration cost are the “textbook” 4(b)(i) pattern, a theory which has been expressly rejected in prior WIPO cases (Mecalac Construction Equipment UK Limited v. Domain Admin, Global IP Holdings Inc, WIPO Case No. D2026-1396, and DANIEL DIEMERS v. Domain Admin, WIPO Case No. D2026-1004);
iii) the Complaint is conclusory on bad faith, producing no evidence of targeting and of the Respondent’s awareness of the Complainants, and relying only on a for-sale listing and the asking price as its bad-faith case;
iv) the Complainants characterized the case as a “textbook case of cybersquatting” notwithstanding the fact that they knew the Respondent was a professional domain investor and they had no evidence of targeting, no evidence of any contact, solicitation, or correspondence between the parties, and no documentary basis for any inference that the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name because of them.

C. Complainants’ first Supplemental Filing

In its Supplemental Filing of June 23, 2026, the Complainants rebut the Respondent’s assertion, included in a Declaration submitted as Annex 1 to the Response, that the price at which the disputed domain name was listed was selected by the Respondent within an algorithmically generated valuation band produced by the Atom.com website based on its proprietary valuation model, which takes into account length, dictionary status, comparable aftermarket sales, and other factors and that the listed price band was not set by reference to the Complainants or their business.

The Complainants point out that, on June 1, 2026, the date of filing of the Complaint, the three marketplace platforms where the disputed domain name has been listed showed the asking price of USD $89,995 (Atom.com) and at USD $99,995 (the Spaceship and Namecheap marketplaces), while on June 12, 2026, after the Respondent’s identity was revealed, the asking price stood at USD $149,995 on the Atom.com website and at USD $179,995 on the Spaceship and Namecheap interfaces. The Complainants highlight that the same increase of prices have been observed on the Respondent’s website “www.bqdn.com”, where the Respondent displays the same listing template Atom.com applies across his account.

The Complainants conclude that, since the Respondent has declared that it selected the listed price, it cannot characterize a change in that price as an automated event for which it bears no responsibility, because by the selection of the price was its act, not the platform’s.

D. Respondent’s Supplemental Filing

In its Supplemental Filing of July 22, 2026, the Respondent questions the authority of the Second Complainant to maintain this proceeding since it filed and prosecuted this proceeding pro se, describing itself as the “President and Co-Founder” of the first Complainant and as representing all three Complainants, but has not provided any corporate resolution authorizing it to initiate this proceeding on behalf of the First and the Second Complainant.

The Respondent also states that, contrary to the Complainants’ allegations, the price for the disputed domain name on the Atom.com website was increased from $89,995 to $149,995 on May 18, 2026, before the filing of the Complaint, as highlighted by a Atom.com price change timeline annexed to the Supplemental Filing. The Respondent further clarifies that the higher prices observed by the Complainants on Spaceship and Namecheap were a consequence of the Atom.com website rules, which require that any domain namelisted on partner platforms, including Spaceship and Namecheap, must be priced at a minimum of 10% above the price listed on the Atom.com website. The Respondent concludes that the Complainants’ assertions as to the price change made by the Respondent is disproven by documentary evidence drawn from the Atom.com website provided by the Respondent.

E. Complainants’ second Supplemental Filing

In its second Supplemental Filing of July 25, 2027, the Complainants reiterate arguments already raised in the Complaint and respond to the Respondent’s objections as to the authority of the Second Complainant to maintain this proceeding.

The Complainants highlight that UDRP panels routinely permit related complainants — individuals and affiliated entities with a common grievance and common interest in the disputed domain name — to proceed jointly where, as here, they share a clear nexus: common ownership, common control, and a shared trademark interest in HYPERFLY. The Complainants also state that Panels assess this pragmatically, not through a formal corporate-law lens, and that the Respondent identifies no prejudice arising from the joint filing, because there is none — the same core facts and the same mark are at issue regardless of which Complainant entity or individual formally holds title to it.

The Complainants also point out that the Rules do not require a complainant to submit a board resolution or formal corporate authorization as a precondition to filing and submit that the Second Complainant’s role as an owner/principal across the related Complainant entities, combined with its personal and family ownership interest in the HYPERFLY mark itself, is sufficient basis for it to proceed with this proceeding on behalf of the Complainants collectively.

F. Respondent’s second Supplemental Filing

In its Supplemental Filing of July 31, 2026, the Respondent objects to the admissibility of the Complainant’s second Supplemental Filing, indicating that it consists exclusively of conclusory assertions unsupported by evidence and that such submission does not address the arguments raised in the Response.

6. Discussion and Findings

According to paragraph 15(a) of the Rules: “A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.” Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy directs that the Complainants must prove each of the following:

(i) that the disputed domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainants have rights;
(ii) that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and
(iii) that the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

6.1 First preliminary procedural issue: the Parties’ Supplemental Filings

Before entering into the merits of the case, the Panel addresses the issue of the unsolicited supplemental filings submitted by the Parties to the Center.

No provision concerning supplemental filings are made in the Rules or Supplemental Rules, except at the request of the panel according to paragraph 12 of the Rules, which states the panel, in its sole discretion, may request any further statements or documents from the parties it may deem necessary to decide the case.

According to paragraph 10 of the Rules, the Panel has the authority to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence, and also to conduct the proceedings with due expedition, ensuring that the Parties are treated with equality and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.

As stated in section 4.6 of the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), unsolicited supplemental filings are generally discouraged – unless specifically requested by the panel – and the party submitting an unsolicited supplemental filing should clearly show its relevance to the case and why it was unable to provide the information contained therein in its complaint or response.

Accordingly, UDRP panels generally accept supplemental filings only when they provide material new evidence or a fair opportunity to respond to arguments that could not reasonably have been anticipated. See, along these lines, Welcomemat Services, Inc. v. Michael Plummer Jr., MLP Enterprises Inc., WIPO Case No. D2017-0481.

The Panel accepts the Complainants’ first Supplemental Filing as it addresses circumstances that could not be known at the time of the filing of the Complaint, namely the claimed automatic generation of the asking price for the disputed domain name on the Atom.com website referenced in the Response. The Panel also accepts the Respondent’s Supplemental Filing to the extent that it offers rebuttal to the Complainants’ statements included in its Supplemental Filing. The Panel further accepts the Respondent’s submissions as to the asserted lack of authority of the Second Complainant to maintain this proceeding on behalf of the three Complainants and the Complainants’ subsequent reply (contained in the second Complainant’s Supplemental Filing) on this specific issue.

The Panel noted the Respondent’s objection (in its second Supplemental Filing) to the admission of the Complainant’s second Supplemental Filing, and notes that the outcome of the case would not have been any different had the Parties’ Supplemental Filings not been admitted. However, given the complexity of the case and the numerous statements of both Parties, the Panel has accepted the Supplemental Filings for the sake of completeness, in order to grant both Parties equal rights to provide their arguments and to reach a fair decision.

6.2 Second preliminary procedural issue: the Second Complainant’s authority to maintain the proceeding on behalf of the three Complainants

In its Supplemental Filing, the Respondent stated that the Second Complainant has filed and prosecuted this proceeding pro se, describing itself as “President and Co-Founder” of the first Complainant and as representing all three Complainants but failing to provide any corporate resolution authorizing it to initiate these proceedings on behalf of the first and the third Complainant.

The Complainants replied to the issue raised by the Respondent, in its second Supplemental Filing, indicating that UDRP panels permit related complainants with a common grievance and common interest in a domain name to proceed jointly where they share a clear nexus. The Complainants also submit that the Rules do not require a complainant to submit a board resolution or formal corporate authorization as a precondition to filing.

The Panel finds that the fact the Second Complainant is the co-owner of trademark registrations for HYPEFLY on which the Complaint is based, which are co-owned by the third Complainant (and, in at least one case, also by the first Complainant), and the Second Complainant’s role as an owner and principal of the first Complainant, are sufficient basis for the second Complainant to proceed with this proceeding on behalf of the Complainants collectively.

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainants’ trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“WIPO Overview 3.1”), section 1.7.

The Complainants have shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.2.1. Indeed, the Complainants have provided evidence of ownership of valid trademark registrations for HYPERFLY (word mark).

The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.7.
In addition, the ccTLD “.ai” can be disregarded under the first element test, being a standard registration requirement. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 1.11.1.

Therefore, the Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests

In light of the Panel’s findings under the following section, it is not necessary to address this issue separately.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

In the present case, the Panel notes that the Respondent is a professional domain investor which acquired the disputed domain name in November 2025. At that time, the Complainant had registered the HYPERFLY mark for goods in classes 25 and 28 and for online retail services in class 35 in the United States and other countries (but not in the UAE, where the Respondent is based) and had used the HYPERFLY mark in connection with the promotion and sale of technical performance apparel, sportswear, training equipment, footwear, and headgear, including online via the Complainants’ website “www.hyperfly.com”.

The Complainants states that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name in bad faith to offer it for sale at amounts in excess of the out-of-pocket costs and essentially based its bad faith claim on the notoriety of its trademark, asserting that HYPERFLY can be exclusively referred to the Complainants’ mark. The Complainants further points out that, given the Respondent is a domain name investor, it had heightened duty of trademark due diligence before registering the disputed domain name and no reasonable basis exists on which the Respondent could claim it was unaware of the HYPERFLY registered trademark when it registered the disputed domain name.

The Panel notes that, as stated in prior decisions, such as typeguard, inc. v. Narendra Ghimire, WIPO Case No. DAI2026-0029 (<glide.ai>), the practice as such of registering a domain name for subsequent resale does not by itself support a claim that the registrant registered the domain name in bad faith with the primary purpose of selling it to a trademark owner (or its competitor), as the complainant must demonstrate that the disputed domain name was registered to profit from or exploit the complainant’s trademark.

As stated in section 3.1.1 of the WIPO Overview 3.1, “[c]ircumstances indicating that a domain name was registered for the bad-faith purpose of selling it to a trademark owner can be highly fact-specific; the nature of the domain name (e.g., whether a typo of a famous mark, a domain name wholly incorporating the relevant mark plus a geographic term or one related to the complainant’s area of commercial activity, or a pure dictionary term) and the distinctiveness of trademark at issue, among other factors, are relevant to this inquiry. The use to which the domain name is put, particularly the absence of circumstances indicating that the respondent’s aim in registering the disputed domain name was to profit from or exploit the complainant’s trademark, can inform a panel’s assessment of the respondent’s intent. Such circumstances notably include credible pre-complaint website content corresponding to a dictionary meaning of the term comprising the domain name, as opposed to targeting the trademark owner or its competitor. Panels have also viewed a respondent’s use of ‘negative keywords’ or similar means to avoid links/content impermissibly capitalizing on a trademark as relevant in assessing a respondent’s overall intent.

If, on the other hand, circumstances indicate that the respondent’s intent in registering the disputed domain name was in fact to profit in some fashion from or otherwise exploit the complainant’s trademark, panels will find bad faith on the part of the respondent. Although panel assessment remains fact-specific, generally speaking such circumstances, alone or together, include: (i) the respondent’s likely knowledge of the complainant’s rights, (ii) the distinctiveness of the complainant’s mark, (iii) a pattern of abusive registrations by the respondent, (iv) website content targeting the complainant’s trademark, e.g., through links to the complainant’s competitors, (v) threats to point or actually pointing the domain name to trademark-abusive content, (vi) threats to ‘sell to the highest bidder’ or otherwise transfer the domain name to a third party, (vii) failure of a respondent to present a credible evidence-backed rationale for registering the domain name, (viii) a respondent’s request for goods or services in exchange for the domain name, (ix) a respondent’s attempt to force the complainant into an unwanted business arrangement, (x) a respondent’s past conduct or business dealings, or (xi) a respondent’s registration of additional domain names corresponding to the complainant’s mark subsequent to being put on notice of its potentially abusive activity”.

The Panel has carefully reviewed all the documents and statements submitted by the parties and notes that, based on the records, there is no evidence that the Respondent specifically targeted the Complainants’ mark when it registered and offered the disputed domain name for sale.

The Panel also notes that, whilst the Complainants appear to have established over time a well-known brand within the martial arts and combat sports community, the evidence provided by the Respondent shows that the HYPERFLY mark had already been independently used by multiple parties before the Complainants’ first use of the mark (including in earlier trademark registrations) and continues to be used by unrelated third parties operating in different sectors, including across AI, water sports, pharma, aviation, and marketing (none of it connected to the Complainants). The Respondent has demonstrated the existence, amongst others, of the following third-party brands and entities that suggest that “HyperFly” is not only referrable to the Complainants’ mark:

– Aerofoils HYPERFLY, a German water-sports company that markets a complete product line, including the Hyperfly Set 230L Aerofoils Inflatable eFoil, and runs an “Aerofoils Hyperfly Academy”;
– Hyperfly Developers (hyperflydevelopers.com), an AI/web development company offering NLP, LLM-powered AI assistants, and machine learning integration;
– Hyperfly (@hyperflyai) on X, an AI-driven trading tool on the Hyperliquid blockchain (cryptocurrency token “FLY” listed on CoinGecko), with nearly 4,000 followers;
– Hyperfly by VML Health Platforms, a global pharmaceutical HCP engagement platform;
– HyperFly™ by CloseBi (closebi.ai/hyperfly), an AI-driven hyperlocal marketing platform;
– HyperFly, Private Jet Charter & Aviation WordPress Theme, a commercial web template on ThemeForest for private aviation.

The Panel also notes that the disputed domain name was acquired as part of a documented batch acquisition together with other .ai domain names consisting of two-word combinations, a circumstance which appears to be more consistent with a portfolio investment strategy than with targeting the Complainants.

In addition, the Respondent has shown that its investment strategy has consistently focused on premium
.com and .ai domain names formed from dictionary words or common-word combinations, including the following domain names that it owns, encompassing the term “hyper”:

hyperpay.ai
hypercast.ai
hyperwave.ai
hypercurve.ai
hyperform.ai
hyperhive.ai
hyperdesk.ai
hyperwise.ai
hypersign.ai
hyperlist.ai

Moreover, the Respondent has not engaged in a pattern of abusive registrations and indeed, as highlighted in the Complaint, the Respondent has been involved as a respondent in three prior UDRP cases which were all concluded in its favor (Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. v. James Booth, BQDN.com, WIPO Case No. D2019-1042 (<rcc.com>), Picture Organic Clothing v. James Booth, Booth.com Ltd, WIPO Case No. D2020- 2016 (<picture.com>) and Sequent (Schweiz) AG v. James Booth, WIPO Case No. D2025-1565 (<sequent.com>)).

Furthermore, no evidence of an offer for sale of the disputed domain name directed to the Complainants has been provided and, indeed, there has been prima facie no contact between the parties prior to the filing of the Complaint.

Under the circumstances, the fact that the Respondent has listed the disputed domain name for sale for five figure prices and, after May 18, 2026 (notably, before the filing of the Complaint), increased the price on the Atom.com website to a six-figure amount is not sufficient to demonstrate that the Respondent intended to profit from or exploit the Complainants’ trademark.

The evidence on record suggests that the Respondent, on balance of probabilities, registered the disputed domain name as part of a broader batch acquisition of multiple potentially valuable domain names in the AI space, and was selected for its perceived commercial or brandable value as combination of two ordinary English words with substantial independent commercial appeal across multiple industries, without specifically targeting the Complainants.

The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established.

D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking

Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules provides that, if after considering the submissions, the Panel finds that the Complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at RDNH or to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its decision that the Complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding. The mere lack of success of the complaint is not, on its own, sufficient to constitute reverse domain name hijacking. WIPO Overview 3.1, section 4.16.
The Panel is not persuaded that the circumstances of this case justify a finding of RDNH. The Complainants have long-standing registrations for the HYPERFLY mark which predate the acquisition of the disputed domain name by the Respondent and the mark is identically reproduced in the disputed domain name.

Moreover, the Complainants’ trademark appears to be known in its sector, and the disputed domain name has been redirected to a website offering the disputed domain name for sale. Therefore, the Complainants’ case that the disputed domain name was registered in bad faith, while unsuccessful, was not so weak as to render the filing of the Complaint an act of bad faith.

In view of the above, the Panel declines the request to make a finding of RDNH.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

The request for a Reverse Domain Name Hijacking is also denied.

Luca Barbero
(Presiding Panelist)

Deanna Wong Wai Man
(Panelist)

Gerald M. Levine
(Panelist)

Date: August 5, 2026